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GENERAL SEMANTICS, STARE DECISIS AND CHANGE
THROUGH CONSIDERATIONS OF A NEW ETHICS
1/
Irene S. Ross -
My paper today is entitled General Semantics, Stare Decisis
and Change Through Considerations of a New Ethics.
I begin this talk with an expression of gratitude to
Gerard Nierenberg for his latest book Workable Ethics, - which
brought me to a rereajing and a new appreciation for Alfred Korzybski's
Manhood of Humanity. - The principles and precepts set forth in
this earliest known work of Korzybski form the basis for Nierenberg's
definition of workable ethics and for the foundation of this paper.
In a recent column in the New York Times, 4/ Russell Baker
observed that there are "two categories of words: abstract words and
stract words". That "there are two kinds of words because there are
two kinds of minds: the abstract mind and the stract mind". Since I
could not find a definition for the word "stract", I understood that
he was being humorous. He did not have a problem, he said, with a
word like "cat" which he could visualize as a "sneaky, furred,
quadruped torturing a mouse to death", whereas a word like "amortize"
left him mentally paralyzed because he could not visualize an
amortizing.
1/ Administrative Law Judge, New York State Department of Labor.
This paper was first presented to the Institute of General Semantics
at Yale University on July 28, 1988, and is reprinted here by
permission.
2/ Workable Ethics, by Gerard I. Nierenberg, Nierenberg & Zeif
Publishers, New York, copyright 1987, Gerard I. Nierenberg.
3/ Manhood of Humanity, by Alfred Korzybski, Second Edition, The
International Non-Aristotelian Library Publishing Company, Institute
of General Semantics, Distributors, Lakeville, Connecticut, copy-
Fight 1921 by E. P. Dutton & Co., copyright 1950 by Estate of
Alfred Korzybski.
4/ New York Times, July 13, 1988, page A25, Col. 1, The Noose Was
Made of Ribbon, Russell Baker.
Reading his column, I realized some of the pitfalls I would
face delivering a paper on three such abstractions as general
semantics, stare decisis and ethics. Although I had a more difficult
time trying to visualize Baker's cat with his "stract" word "cat"
(while visions of my own playful, winsome pussycat, Schroedinger,
kept dancing through my mind), than I had with the word "amortize"
since I had been schooled in a circumscribed definition of that word,
I feel that I must offer some definitions lest I cause those of you
who have had no prior experience with such terms as "general seman-
tics", "stare decisis" and "ethics" to become mentally paralyzed.
Except for the term "stare decisis", for which I will offer
a straightforward, dictionary definition, I may lead you down the
garden path somewhat, in defining general semantics and ethics. You
will hear me defining and redefining, sometimes telling you the
meanings ascribed by others to these terms and sometimes telling you
what they think these terms do not mean.
I offer you, first, some definitions for "general semantics"
The first such definition I take from Alfred Korzybski himself, the
founder of General Semantics, which I und in the Introduction to
the 2nd edition of Science and Sanity - (1941, p. vi): "General
semantics is not any 'philosophy' or 'psychology', or 'logic', in the
ordinary sense. It is a new extensional discipline which explains
and trains us how to use our nervous systems most efficiently. It is
not a medical science, but like bacteriology, it is indispensable for
medicine in general, and for psychiatry, mental hygiene, and education
in particular. In brief, it is the formulation of a new non-
aristotelian system of orientation which affects every branch of
science and life. The separate issues involved are not entirely new;
their methodological formulation as a system which is workable,
teachable and so elementary that it can be applied to children, is
entirely new."
Stuart A, Mayper, - / Prof. Emeritus of the University of
Bridgeport, Ct., offers the following definition of "general seman-
tics": "General Semantics is a study of human behavior from the
5/ Science and Sanity, Alfred Korzybski, Fourth Edition, The
International Non-Aristotelian Library Publishing Company,
Distributed by the Institute of General Semantics, Lakeville,
Connecticut, page XXVI.
6/ The Players of Null-A, A. E. Van Vogt, page 67, a Berkley
Medallion Book, published by Berkley Publishing Corporation,
published April 1974.
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point of view of up-to-date knowledge of neural processes and their
interaction with language."
A. E. Van Vogt, in Players of Null-A, 7/ a science-fiction
work, describes general semantics as follows: "Semantics has to do
with the meaning of meaning or the meaning of words. G.S. has to do
with the relationship of the human nervous system to the world around
it, and therefore it includes semantics. It provides an integrating
system for all human thought and experience."
George Doris, A/ a management consultant from London,
England, describes "general semantics" as: "A comprehensive,
systematic way of understanding and working with 'my' world which I
find psychologically and emotionally satisfying."
Kenneth G. Johnson, 2/ Prof. Emeritus of the University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee, says: "G.S. tries to keep our solutions from
becoming our problems."
Through G.S., I learned that there are not categories in
nature; that we, as humans, create the categories through which we
see relatedness, and so we can put together any two, three or infi-
nite number of things and find relatedness. Therefore, I attempt to
bring together such seemingly unrelated constructs as G.S., stare
decisis and ethics.
With these various definitions and descriptions of G.S.,
you will no more be able to comprehend the immensity of its aspects
without more and more study and experience with it, than I can
envision Russell Baker's cat without myself having seen it and
experienced it, time and time again.
With these definitions, however, I intended to convey to
you my belief that G.S. is the methodology by which we can examine
the problems we have gotten ourselves into and find solutions before
it is too late.
The definition of "stare decisis" which I will give to you
is taken from Black's Law Dictionary. It is taken from the Latin and




precedents; to maintain former adjudications. Doctrine of stare
decisis rests upon the principle that law by which men are governed
should be fixed, definite, and known, and that, when the law is
declared by court of competent jurisdiction authorized to construe
it, such declaration, in absence of palpable mistake or error, is
itself evidence of the law until changed by competent authority.
Stare Decisis Et Non Quieta Movere -- To adhere to precedents and not
to unsettle things which are established.
Therefore, when a client comes to his attorney and asks the
question, "Is it legal?", the attorney then researches the law to
find similar fact situations which have been decided by the courts
and which stand as precedents upon which similar cases must be
adjudicated similarly because of the rule of stare decisis. If the
fact situation brought by the client is different, to the degree that
the difference makes a difference (a phrase which triggers a reaction
in General Semanticists because they recognize that there is a
difference to some degree between any two similar situations or
things) and there is no precedent for this fact situation, the
attorney tries to establish a new precedent in bringing this case to
court.
You will note that the question asked of the attorney is
"Is it legal?" not "Is it right or ethical?"
Korzybski made some hars 0 $valuations about the law.
Quoting from Manhood of Humanity, - he said: "Laws, legal ideas,
date from the beginning of civilization. Legal speculation was
wonderfully developed in parallel lines with theology and philosophy
before the natural and exact sciences came into existence. Law was
always made by the few and in general for the purpose of preserving
the "existing order," or for the reestablishment of the old order and
the punishment of the offenders against it. Dogmatic theology is by
its very nature, unchangeable. The same can be said in regard to the
spirit of the law. Law was and is to protect the past and present
status of society and, by its very essence, must be very conservative,
if not reactionary."
Korzybski's indictment in 1921 could be echoed today.
Recently, the Supreme Court, -i/ which, as it is presently
constituted, has a conservative majority, voted to reconsider a major
10/ Manhood of Humanity, loc. cit., page 35.
11/ Runyan v. McCrary, 1976 U.S. S. Ct.
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1976 civil rights decision. The case involves a Reconstruction era
law providing that all people have the same right "to make and
enforce contracts" as "is enjoyed by white citizens". The Supreme
Court's 1976 decision turned the little used statute into a potent
weapon, permitting its use by private plaintiffs to sue discrimi-
nating private schools and to seek damages for racial discrimination
in private business dealings generally.
A further example of conservative judicial reactivism is
the attempt to restore through the Court the power of state legisla-
tures to restrict abortion rights.
In what has been called "judicial reactivism" to the
perceived excesses of a then liberally constituted Court, it now
seeks to overrule or circumvent its own judicial precedent. We
realize the immensity of the power conveyed in our presidential
elections when we realize that one of the great prizes of victory for
the executive branch of our government is the opportunity to make
appointments to the Federal district courts and recommend appointments
to the highest Court in the land.
The factors involved in precedent and change with regard to
our courts appear to be, then, the political and ethical persuasion
of our jurists. Nothing significant appears to have c~ged with
regard to jurisprudence since Korzybski wrote in 1921 : "And now
what must we say of the so-called sciences -- the pseudo sciences --
of ethics and jurisprudence and economics and politics and government?
For the answer we have only to open our eyes and behold the world.
By virtue of the advancement that has long been going on with ever-
accelerated logarithmic rapidity in invention, in mathematics, in
physics, in chemistry, in biology, in astronomy and in applications
of them, time and space and matter have been already conquered to
such an extent that our globe, once so seemingly vast, has virtually
shrunken to the dimensions of an ancient province . . ." He goes on
to say that although a new ethical wisdom is demanded, the social
sciences, the so-called sciences of ethics and jurisprudence, have
lagged behind and asks "Why?" they have lagged behind. He goes on to
say: "The answer is not far to seek nor difficult to understand.
They have lagged behind, partly because they have been hampered by
the traditions and the habits of a bygone world -- they have looked
backward instead of forward; they have lagged behind, partly because
they have depended upon the barren methods of verbalistic philosophy
-- they have been metaphysical instead of scientific; they have
lagged behind, partly because they have been often dominated by the
L2 Manhood of Humanity, loc. cit., page 20.
lusts of cunning "politicians" instead of being led by the wisdom of
enlightened statesmen; they have lagged behind, partly because they
have been predominantly concerned to protect "vested interests," upon
which they have in the main depended for support; the fundamental
cause, however, of their lagging behind is found in the astonishing
fact that, despite their being by their very nature most immediately
concerned with the affairs of mankind, they have not discovered what
man really is but have from time immemorial falsely regarded human
beings either as animals or else as combinations of animals and
something supernatural."
I do not mean to suggest by this paper that the motivations
of our esteemed Court are venal or in any way self-serving, but that
its ethical standards are shortsighted and backward looking.
Which brings me to a consideration of the meaning of ethics
and, finally, to a proposal of a new ethical standard.
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (published 1933)
gives this definition of ethics: "The or a science of morals. The
moral system of a particular writer or school of thought. The rules
of conduct recognized in certain limited.departments of human life.
The science of human duty in its widest extent, includes, besides
ethics proper, the science of law whether civil, political, or
international."
After that has been said, it is anybody's guess what ethics
means to any individual.
Since Korzybski wrote Manhood Humanity, we have had another
World War, many other wars in many parts of the world, the creation
of atomic and hydrogen bombs, a nuclear accident at Chernobyl,
environmental pollution, acid rain, the warming of the earth through
the "greenhouse effect", overpopulation concerns, drug wars and AIDS.
How are all of these disasters possible if human beings are
governed by ethical considerations?
Cassius Jackson Keyser, 13/ writing on Korzybski's concept
of Man, says, "It is often said that ethics is a thing which it is
impossible to teach. Just the opposite is true -- it is impossible
not to teach ethics, for the teaching of it is subtly carried on in
13/ Mathematical Philosophv. Lecture XX, 1922, Cassius Jackson
Keyser, reprinted in Manhood of Humanity, loc. cit., page 322.
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all our teaching, whether consciously or not, being essentially
involved in the teacher's 'philosophy of human nature'."
Lester C. Thurow, 4/ dean of the Sloan School of
Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in a recent
article in the New York Times considers the necessity for improving
business ethics and says: "Ethical dilemmas arise when a person's
actions may contribute to the common good of the community but at the
same time hurt his self-interest. Choosing to sacrifice one's
appetites and self-interest is at the heart of ethical action."
It is this equation of ethics and self-sacrifice which is,
for me, at the heart of the "old" ethics and demands a new way of
looking at ethics. If I choose to exercise my right to pollute the
air, whose air am I polluting? If I choose to make war, sell "crack",
defoliate our forests or cause an opposer in a negotiation to be a
"loser", who is the ultimate loser?
If I choose not to do these things, what am I sacrificing?
If I concern myself with "who will get the last piece of
pie", how am I using my creative abilities to make more pies?
Korzybski 5/ gives us a new basis for defining ethics when
he says: ". . . human beings possess a most remarkable capacity
which is entirely peculiar to them . . . the capacity to summarize,
digest and appropriate the labors and experiences of the past; . .
use the fruits of past labors and experiences as intellectual or
spiritual capital for developments in the present; . . . employ as
instruments of increasing power the accumulated achievements of the
all-precious lives of past generations spent in trial and error,
trial and success; . . . the capacity of human beings to conduct
their lives in the ever increasing light of inherited wisdom; . .
the capacity in virtue of which man is at once the heritor of the
bygone ages and the trustee of posterity . . ." Because humanity is
just this magnificent natural agency by which the past livesl 7 the
present and the present for the future, he defines Humanity - as
the Time-Bindina Class of Life.
14/ New York Times, June 14, 1987, Ethics Doesn't Start in Business
Schools, Lester C. Thurow.
15/ Manhood of Humanity, loc. cit., page 59.
16/ Ibid., page 63.
It is only when we recognize the dimension and capacity of
human beings that "we look forward to an ethics, a jurisprudence
* * . a science and art of human life and society . . . destined to
endless advancement in accord with the potencies of Human Nature".
To help us recognize our full potentiality and our related-
ness to the world around us and to keep us from making our solutions
part of the problem, I see a great need for the study of G.S.
I see a great need for the Courts to recognize that "process"
and "change" (that factor of time which is the "difference that makes
a difference") -- process and change can allow for changing precedents.
Stare decisis is not immutable but the Courts must not be shortsighted
or backward-looking in seeking change, but must be forward-looking
and ask with each new decision, "How does this decision affect the
qenerations yet unborn?"
